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ABSTRACT
The growth of South Africa’s apartheid era defence industry was
propelled by international isolation following the 1984 UN arms
embargo and revealed military technology deficiencies during the
border war. Weapons innovation became an imperative, fostering
development of frontier technologies and upgrades of legacy
platforms that drove expansion in arms exports. However, this
golden era was not to last. The 1994 election of the country’s first
democratic government switched resources from military to
human security. The resultant defence-industrial stagnation
continues to this day, exacerbated by corruption, unethical sales,
and government mismanagement. The industry’s survival into the






The rise of South Africa’s defence industry is legend. From modest beginnings, the
Republic’s competitively priced, high-quality and battle-tested weapons became a
global brand. Arms exports increased in the 1980s, but this was not how it was meant
to be. The 1977 UN Security Council Resolution 418, which embargoed UN member
states from exporting arms to South Africa, was intended to emasculate the South
African military, weakening its ability to indiscriminately kill civilians protesting
against the apartheid Regime. There were two principal factors that worked against
this outcome. Firstly, Pretoria circumvented the worst effects of the embargo by covertly
importing skills, technology, components, and machinery from abroad,1 as well as devis-
ing elaborate schemes involving front companies, smuggling networks and deals with
“pariah” states, such as Pinochet’s Chile, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Argentina’s
Junta.2 Secondly, South Africa’s border conflicts exposed numerous deficiencies in the
military equipment used by its armed forces, encouraging domestic defence industry
to innovate. Robust defence industrial development lasted only until the cessation of hos-
tilities in 1989. Post-1994, a newly independent South Africa had banished apartheid, and
sought instead to elevate the lives of its suppressed black citizenry. Into this brave new
world, the goal was development within the broader national aspirations of human secur-
ity, replacing the traditional emphasis on military security.
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The purpose of this paper, then, is to analyse South Africa’s post-independence
defence contraction following Pretoria’s policy switch from defence to development.
The decline of defence; generally, but defence industry, in particular, was caused by a
combination of economic, social and political factors. During Nelson Mandela’s 1990s
Presidency, the focus on human security was associated with heavy budgetary cuts to
the armed forces and defence industry. Institutional efforts to overcome the resulting
demand deficiency and arrest the decline of South Africa’s defence industry (SADI)
were structured around three “sustainment” policies: 1) the “Turn of the Century”
offset package linked to the controversial arms deal; 2) post-Millennium efforts to
foster arms exports; and 3), the contemporary push for international defence industrial
partnership. The first two of these policy approaches have been mired in controversy: an
offset programme that has been plagued by allegations of corruption, and the desperate
pursuit of overseas arms sales that has led to unethical practices, and the infringement of
arms control legislation. The “open sores” of these contentious events continue to fester,
heightening defence industrial vulnerability. International partnerships have proved less
disputatious, but the concern is whether they have acted to dismantle, rather than
sustain, the ownership and manufacturing structures of SADI.
Search for military effectiveness drives innovation: 1966–89
Since formation of the Union in 1910 until independence in 1994, South Africa has faced
two principal threats.3 There was firstly the inherent internal danger of an uprising from its
suppressed local African population. The end of WWII hostilities paved the way for the
institutionalisation of apartheid (racial “apartness”). White racialist domination had
been coined “internal colonisation”,4 and the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 (followed by
Soweto incident in 1976) intensified local and international anger, making internal instabil-
ity palpably more real. The second threat facing South Africa was more strategic, coming
from a land-based pan-African army. This external danger crystallised through the South
African border conflict from 1966 onwards. Characterised as the wars of decolonisation,
hostilities began in Angola, where South Africa operated as the de facto colonial power,
deploying its forces against the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Throughout the
next two decades, the South African military was engaged in both conventional and asym-
metrical warfare against the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in
Namibia, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZAMLA), and counterinsurgency operations in Zambia.
Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, these border conflicts morphed from inde-
pendence struggles into ideological campaigns, involving the USSR and its client state,
Cuba. Indeed, there were reportedly up to 36,000 Cuban regular forces operating in
Angola in 1976.5 Although the Angolan and Namibian military represented a disorga-
nised ragtag of disparate forces by comparison to the South African Defence Forces
(SADF), the latter’s military equipment proved inadequate as revealed during the
1975–76 Operation Savannah in Angola. South Africa’s vintage armour and artillery
were designed for a doctrine focused on internal security rather than conventional
warfighting against an enemy equipped with modern Soviet-supplied heavy weapons.
Not only was the SADF artillery out-ranged by Cuban/FAPLA 130 mm field howitzers
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and 122 mm Katyusha rockets, but its Eland armoured cars were vulnerable to enemy
anti-tank defences.6
These operational deficiencies, along with the 1977 UN Security Council Resolution
418 embargoing UN member states from exporting arms to South Africa and the 1984
UN Resolution 558 “requesting” all member nations to refrain from procuring South
African arms, meant that an indigenous South African defence industrial solution was
urgently required.7 Pretoria urgently set about expanding the critical defence-industrial
infrastructure created in 1968 through the establishment of the Armaments Corporation
of South Africa. Better known by its acronym, ARMSCOR, it was the country’s first pro-
duction and procurement organisation. At its peak in the 1980s, this state-owned corpor-
ation owned nine production facilities undertaking final assembly and systems
integration of military platforms. Some 130,000 workers were employed both directly
and indirectly in domestic arms production.8
ARMSCOR and major private sector defence industrial establishments responded to
the weapons technology challenge by indigenously developing and producing a broad
array of innovative systems. For example, amongst a whole range of adapted and
locally developed land systems, there was the RATEL Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV).
On entering service in 1976 it became only the world’s third IFV.9 One of the
RATEL’s variants, the ZT3, was armed with the Denel-developed 5,000 m range ZT3
laser-guided anti-tank missile, which proved “devastatingly effective” during the 1987–
88 campaign.10 Moreover, the SADF’s R1 standard rifle had been developed from the
Belgian 7,62 FN FAL gun; in turn, the R1 was itself later replaced by the R4, derived
from the Israeli Galil rifle.11 The list of innovative land systems includes several other for-
midable weapon systems: the former British Centurion Main Battle Tank, upgraded via
several experimental versions into the formidable 105 mm Olifant tank; the G5 155 mm
howitzer, which was crash-developed to outgun Cuban artillery, and described as the
“most advanced piece of its era”; the subsequent linked development of the unique 46-
ton G6 self-propelled version of the G5, the world’s first long range (75 km) gun, inte-
grated onto a wheeled chassis; a frequency-agile military radio, presenting another
world’s first; and the Cheetah C multi-role fighter, Rooivalk attack and Oryx medium
helicopters and the Umkhonto surface-to-air missile.12
These and other South African technologically-advanced and battle-proven weapon
systems drove exponential increases in overseas arms sales. The Republic’s weapons
exports grew by a remarkable 300 per cent between 1982 and 1989, with the share of
arms exports in total production hitting a high of 20 per cent.13 Over the longer
period, 1969–1984, arms sales rose from (Rand) R52mn to R1,571mn, registering an
annual average real rate of growth of over 13 per cent.14 Two lessons can be highlighted
from this era of South African defence industrial transformation. Firstly, the UN embar-
goes had clearly failed in their objective of constricting SADI’s development and pro-
duction activities.15 Secondly, it was the urgency of securing military effectiveness in
the border war that acted as the catalysing agent for indigenous weapons innovation.
Mandela’s transitioning of defence to security: 1990–99
Transition from a garrison-type state engaged in secretive arms procurement to another
committed to democratic accountability and multi-party scrutiny began in the late 1980s.
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There were several factors driving the movement towards political and economic nor-
mality. Firstly, South Africa’s de-prioritisation of defence occurred at a time when the
Cold War was giving way to a benign global environment. The collapse of the Berlin
wall and the implosion of the USSR had sent procurement budgets tumbling. Secondly,
the Soviet Union’s disappearance and the ending of international ideological warfare
meant that super-power rivalry in Southern Africa had also abated. The Namibia and
Mozambique conflicts were resolved, and the 1988 Three Powers Accord led to the
removal of Cuban forces from Southern Africa. A year later, South African Armed
Forces were withdrawn from the border territories, and the imperative of gaining mili-
tary technology superiority dissolved. Thirdly, the February 1990 release of Nelson
Mandela from prison coincided with Pretoria’s de-emphasis of its hitherto militaristic
foreign policy, encouraging a belated focus on South African socio-economic develop-
ment. A new dawn reflecting shifting priorities from external threats to internal vulner-
abilities had begun.
Ferreira and Liebenberg have termed the 1990s as a decade of transition.16 Following
apartheid’s removal, South Africa held its first all-race democratic elections. Mandela was
elected President of the new African National Congress (ANC) government, inheriting a
country with a legacy of colonial exploitation, deep economic structural problems, racial
oppression, high levels of militarisation, culturally embedded violence and global iso-
lation.17 Partially as a result of these immense threats, South Africa represented fertile
ground for pursuing a development-oriented paradigm anchored to the human security
goals contained in the 1994 UN Developmental Report. The new government bought
heavily into the principle of human security, subscribing to the assumption that the
role and utility of military power was expected to decline in international politics in
the post-Cold War era.18 In 1994, the country’s armed forces were rebadged as the
South African National Defence Forces (SANDF), with a doctrine de-emphasising
war-fighting capability and elevating non-offensive defence.19 In line with the conceptu-
alisation of human security, South Africa’s interpretation of security was broadened
beyond the military to embrace the political, social and economic dimensions of the
new security paradigm.20 After 1994, a series of Government White Papers consolidated
this policy approach, including the 1996 Defence White Paper, two Defence Reviews and
a Department of International Relations and Cooperation White Paper on South African
Participation in Peace-Keeping.21
South Africa’s push for human security was associated with defence contraction.
Between 1989 and 1996, defence expenditure fell by 50 per cent, arms acquisition and
R&D declined by 70 per cent apiece, and arms production in total manufacturing
output decreased from 7 to 3.2 per cent.22 Moreover, the shift from external conflict
to the quelling of internal political violence was associated with a realignment of spend-
ing that favoured personnel and operating costs rather than procurement. Postponement
and cancellation of armaments projects reduced the size of defence industry, and inevi-
tably suppliers went out of business. Those that survived suffered massive reductions in
capacity. Contraction led to the loss of 55,000 defence-industrial jobs between 1989 and
1996, with the decline continuing unabated.23 The SANDF was also affected by this
funding squeeze, suffering downsizing and rationalisation, including the disbanding of
military units and contraction of bases. Redundant, obsolete, and surplus military equip-
ment were sold or destroyed, and the country’s nuclear weapons programme terminated.
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The financial pressures of sustaining expensive military capability in the face of severe
austerity and declining economic growth due to domestic recession was an additional
causal factor in the ensuing continuous under-funding of SANDF.
Significant turbulence was caused by governmental efforts to downsize and restructure
defence industry in line with a continued deterioration in defence spending. As a conse-
quence, the SADI became increasingly concentrated, and by the mid-1990s the govern-
ment-owned Denel and the four largest private sector players accounted for over 90 per
cent of South Africa’s procurement spending.24 Denel dominated the local defence
market, specialising in aerospace, artillery, missiles, and armoured personnel carriers,
accounting for close to 50 per cent of sales over the period 1992–96.25 By contrast,
private sector companies focused on defence electronics, maritime, and support
equipment.
The 1994 repeal of UN Security Council Resolution 558 banning arms exports from
the Republic allowed ARMSCOR to expand its global share of arms production from
0.4 per cent to 2 per cent over five years.26 By 1997, nearly all South African defence
firms were engaged in overseas arms sales, becoming the second biggest manufactured
export, albeit accounting for just one per cent of GDP and manufacturing jobs.27
Arms export success validated product competitiveness, but did little more than keep
production lines warm. Fears began to emerge over SADI’s survival in the absence of
budgetary injections to reverse industrial decline. Yet government efforts to raise
demand and arrest the long and tortuous decline of South Africa’s once powerful
defence economy were undermined by persistent allegations of endemic corruption
and regulatory avoidance.
Corrupt and unethical practices accelerate defence industrial decline:
2000–14
Entering the new Millennium, the ANC government was beset with social, economic,
and political problems. Dismal economic growth had not reduced the budget deficit,
racial inequalities and income disparities had not narrowed and violence and corruption
had metastasised throughout the public sector. There was also an emerging crisis of trust
in government, with growing unease over the credibility, competence, and contradictory
nature of its policies. For example, there was the ANC’s amnesia over its pre-1994 pol-
itical enthusiasm for national socialism; instead, once in power, it aggressively pushed
neoliberal economic policies.28 Then, in 1999, the government did an abrupt “u-turn”
on its promotion of human security by undertaking the biggest foreign arms procure-
ment programme in South African history. The arms deal was controversial at many
levels, but the most fundamental criticism was the acquisition of sophisticated weapon
systems, comprising warships, submarines and advanced fighter jets, in the absence of
any clearly defined actual or potential threat.29 Reports suggest that the government
may have been influenced to procure costly and sophisticated foreign arms because
their acquisition was linked to an ambitious offset package of inward investment that
carried the potential to reboot the country’s declining defence industry.30
The notion of defence offset invariably elicits heated debate, but limited data thwart
definitive judgements on its development impact. A major study by Erikssen on the
European defence industrial base offers inconclusive evidence as to whether offset
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exerts a positive or negative impact.31 Two edited books, one by Martin, and the other by
Brauer and Dunne, offer a contrasting diversity of views on the contribution of offset to
local development.32 At the heart of the offset debate is that the two principal stake-
holders possess competing objectives: the obligor pursues profit maximisation, while
the obligee pursues growth and development, and these two goals are invariably
irreconcilable.
For some analysts, the result of this goal divergence is that offset distorts efficient
resource allocation, is anti-competitive, trade diverting and welfare reducing.33 For
instance, one of the principal modalities of defence offset is licensed production, yet
this is held to add cost compared to off-the-shelf procurement. The offset premium
occurs because of additional requirements, such as training and tooling-up, and the
extra costs are inevitably loaded into the price of the primary defence contract. The
offset premium typically averages between 5 and 10 per cent of the defence contract
value,34 but can reach as much as 30 per cent.35 It is contended that this premium or
offset “over-cost” does not buy general economic development, does not buy new and
sustainable work, and except for limited specific cases, does not result in appreciable
technology transfer.36
Further, there is sparse evidence to suggest that job creation, a principal policy objec-
tive of offset, actually happens. For example, British, US and French offset programmes
were expected to create 75,000 local jobs in Saudi Arabia, but in the event only sourced
some 300 mostly unskilled jobs.37 Similarly, Malaysia’s procurements involving Ameri-
can, British, Russian, Italian, French, and Turkish offset programmes created just 100
local jobs.38 Offset is also argued to be prone to corrupt practices.39 Yet, it is unclear
how serious the problem is once the distinction is made between actual versus potential
corruption.40
While there exists a small body of literature advocating the industrial and technologi-
cal benefits of offset, it is fair to state that most studies adopt a sceptical position, leading
to suspicions that negative assessments are pre-programmed even when offset invest-
ments produce net benefits for a country.41 Offset-induced technology transfer may gen-
erate a number of benefits, such as obviating the arms purchasing state from incurring
the costs of expensive R&D, and providing an efficient mechanism for accessing technol-
ogy compared to straightforward purchase.42 Yet, while offset may not create substantial
numbers of local jobs, empirical evidence suggests that it does act to maintain existing
jobs, as well as cultivating pockets of advanced industrial development, including com-
posite production in Indonesia43 and Malaysia;44 it has led to production of helicopter
systems in Turkey,45and aircraft manufacturing in China.46 Overall, then, offsets may
create net economic benefits,47 including potentially beneficial impacts on exports,
supply chains; and to a lesser extent, indigenous R&D.48 Moreover, long-term partner-
ships are a possible, though not guaranteed, outcome.49
Defence offset: “Voodoo” economics to arrest the decline?
South Africa’s arms deal represented a remarkable volte face from the earlier 1980s low-
cost procurement strategy, and subsequent 1990s austerity (when SANDF had to cancel
or postpone many of its procurement projects). Moreover, the choice of highly sophis-
ticated fighters and corvettes raised fears of possible corruption.50 To sweeten the deal,
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and persuade a reluctant public as to its merits, the acquisitions were tied to obligatory
reciprocal commitments (offsets) that would “magically” generate investment around
four times the value of payments to the overseas defence contractors. The offset projects
were expected directly to stimulate demand, expenditure, and jobs in the country’s ailing
defence economy.
Unsurprisingly, South Africa’s pre-existing 1996 offset policy (or using the official ter-
minology – National Industrial Participation Programme - NIPP), became a microcosm
of the scepticism affecting the subject’s wider empirical analysis. NIPP’s mission was to
“leverage economic benefits and support the development of South African industry
…”51 In order to achieve this goal, NIPP sought to cultivate international industrial part-
nerships to promote local development through a raft of economic mechanisms, includ-
ing technology transfer, enhanced value-added content, exports to new markets, R&D
collaboration, and job creation. In 1996, a new Defence Industrial Participation (DIP)
programme was launched and managed by ARMSCOR.52 Commercial industrial partici-
pation investments would span diverse sectors, including automotive components, tele-
communications, stainless steel and specialty steel plants, mining equipment, gold
jewellery, plastics, timber, mohair jerseys, high quality textiles, and medical products,
including prophylactics aimed at containing the spread of HIV in a country riven by
AIDS. Indeed, the latter project offered an example of how the authorities viewed
offset as a “force for good”.53
The 1998 Defence Review approved the new arms procurement package, as well as its
unusual funding method, involving budgetary rebalancing of cost-savings from military
personnel reductions.54 A shortlist of products and prospective suppliers was identified,
as shown below in Table 1. The eventual arms deal, designated the Strategic Defence Pro-
curement Package (SDPP), was worth over R29bn (US$5bn), with a planned operational
span of some 30 years.55 The headline value of just under R30bn was not universally
accepted, with counter-estimates that procurement costs would eventually escalate to
R53bn once exchange rate fluctuations and the cost of financing were taken into con-
sideration.56 The linked offset obligations borne by the suppliers involved contractual
industrial participation commitments that were estimated at around R110bn, but as
with the cost of the arms deal, this figure was disputed; there being concerns that it
included estimated and unpredictable export sales derived from investments, as well as
“hoped for” regional secondary benefits through Broad-Based Black Economic Empow-
erment (BBBEE) companies.57 Eventually, government officials produced a more conser-
vative R70bn offset value.58 Notwithstanding these disagreements, the government
maintained its position on job creation, arguing that the defence and commercial
offset projects would generate more than 65,000 permanent jobs.59
Table 1. Major armaments acquisitions under SDPP.
Equipment Country of Origin Quantity Planned Date of Delivery
MEKO A200SAN missile corvette Germany 4 2003–05
Type-209 Mod-1400 submarine Germany 3 2005–07
A109 light utility helicopter Italy 30 2003–05
Hawk-100 Mark-120 lead-in fighter trainer UK 24 2005
Super Lynx shipborne helicopter UK 4 2005–06
Gripen-D dual-seat multi-role fighter Sweden/UK 9 2006–08
Gripen-C single-seat multi-role fighter Sweden/UK 19 2009–11
Source: Various sources, including government and press reports, as well as the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 7
As with disputes over the development impact of offset in general, disagreements
persist over the benefits of South Africa’s offset package. It was once memorably
described both as “voodoo economics” and a “monstrous political fraud”.60 More specifi-
cally, there are those who argued the package was ill conceived, representing an enor-
mous waste of resources that yielded little in the form of positive returns.61
Furthermore, job creation was nowhere near the government’s promised target of
65,000, with the lower range of estimates falling between 26,00062 and just 12,000.63
The cost per job created through IP was estimated to be 20 times higher than the
average for the local defence industry;64 the cost escalating due to Rand and interest
rate fluctuations, and the payment period more than doubling from eight to 18
years.65 South Africa’s experience suggests that promised economic investment and
job creation effects generated through offset are largely chimeric.66
There is a contrasting view that offset promoted considerable economic benefits. For
example, Haines argues that offset contributed to industrial diversification, and DIP up to
2012 had generated over 220 projects, accounting for 80 per cent of overall NIPP obli-
gations.67 DIP projects acted to showcase South African defence capabilities that
created longer-term opportunities, including the forging of alliances with original equip-
ment manufacturers (OEMs). This is evidenced by a recent study that concluded DIP
projects had contributed substantial “economic” benefits, including the retention of
over 59,000 jobs, the promotion of like-for-like technology transfer, enhanced export
opportunity through access to OEM international supply chains, and via numerous
long-term partnering arrangements, these offset programmes had significantly strength-
ened industrial and technological sustainability.68 Indeed, a 2014 report sponsored by
SADI argued that the DIP linked to the Strategic Defence Procurement Package was a
lifeline that supported parts of industry from the catastrophic funding decline that
began in 1989.69 In its 2015–16 Annual Report, ARMSCOR announced that just one
of the eight DIPs was still active.70
The 2019 comments of a former ARMSCOR official appear to lend further qualified
weight to the observation that South Africa’s offset programme had contributed positive
value to the local defence economy:
The principal thrust of the DIP was to contribute to the sustainment of “existing” companies
through work packages, export sales, technology transfer and investment. For most benefi-
ciaries, offset value represented a small percentage of their total business portfolio… [but]
… given that SANDF contracts were never sufficient on their own to ensure viability, offset
did play a significant role in influencing survival during extremely tough trading conditions.
Sustainability, however, was not a metric employed by either the offset authority or the obli-
gors. No methodologies evolved to measure sustainability, especially as the beneficiaries pre-
dated the obligation.71
South Africa’s NIP and DIP policies endure. In 2019, there are a multiplicity of obligors,
including Germany, the US, Switzerland, Japan, UK, France, Canada, Netherlands, Italy,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, China, and Finland, with projects spanning the aerospace,
defence, oil and gas, rail, marine, and bus sectors.72 Aerosud remains the flagship
offset partner to numerous tier one foreign defence contractors, including capital, tech-
nology transfer, and work orders on the BAES Typhoon fighter programme, engine sup-
pressors and armoured seats for AgustaWestland military helicopters and internal
assemblies for Boeing commercial aircraft.73 Contemporary NIPP and DIP projects
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are argued to be far removed from stereo-typical low value metal-bashing activities. For
example, MAN Ferrostaal invested in high performance integrated circuits (for a while
representing the only micro-chip manufacturing capacity in Africa); CISCO, in partner-
ship with the local Department of Trade and Industry (dti), invested in an ICT R&D
Centre; and Huawei invested in a joint software innovation Centre.74
The debate over the economic positives and negatives of South Africa’s offset package
is separate from a parallel controversy focused on governance of the arms procurement
deal and linked offset programme. Rumours of corruption, implicating ruling ANC poli-
ticians and their associates, began to emerge after the 1999 arms deal announcement.75
The initial epicentre of the controversy was the use of “multiplier” credits, even though
these are widely employed by other countries to incentivise investment in strategic
sectors of the economy. Obligors benefit from multipliers by gaining offset credit
values representing a multiple of the actual investment value. However, in the South
African context, multipliers were criticised because the inflated offset credit values
appeared to grossly exaggerate Pretoria’s estimates of actual programme benefits. In an
attempt to rebut the criticisms, the government launched a 2001 probe that quickly
adjudged the offset framework to be sound and in conformity with best practice.76
Yet, while the probe’s findings highlighted a lack of government duplicity, it did little
to stem the allegations of impropriety.
In the early 2000s, there were allegations of corruption by French and South African
companies over their supply of a combat management system to the Navy.77 Then, in July
2003, there were revelations that a local aviation company allegedly received bribes from
a British supplier,78 with “dirty” money held to have influenced negotiations over the
award of the Hawk-Gripen contract.79 Germany was also embroiled in the bribery
scandal, with one of its suppliers alleged to have bribed former South African defence
officials over the navy’s corvette deal.80 Then, in the late 2000s, South Africa’s Parliamen-
tary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) published a Report calling for a
full judicial inquiry to investigate SDPP graft allegations. This led to the 2011 establish-
ment of the Arms Procurement Commission (more commonly known as the Seriti Com-
mission of Inquiry, named after its chairperson, Judge Willie Seriti) to investigate the
arms deal.
In early 2014, South Africa’s Trade and Industry Minister submitted the Strategic
Defence Packages Performance Review Report to Parliament, together with a final audit
report on the defence offset package.81 The Report documented that a large sample of
40 of the 121 arms deal offset projects had been audited, leading to the discovery that
several offset projects had not included obligations for job creation. “In fact, of the 40
business plans audited, only 24 included estimates of the number of jobs to be
created” and that the… offset projects “only generated 26,000 direct jobs in ten years,
instead of the 65,000 opportunities promised, indicating that offset had created only
40 per cent of the anticipated offset-derived target”.82
In the summer of 2014, the government initiated a study that found nothing inher-
ently wrong with either the civil or defence offset policies, or their implementation.
The Report highlighted that DIP investment linked to the acquisition of front-line equip-
ment for the Air Force and Navy under the arms deal had led to “some R15 billion being
injected into South African defence companies over the decade following 1999”.83 By the
time the Seriti Commission concluded its probe, it had cost South African taxpayers over
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R113mn, yet the findings published in April 2016 absolved the government, defence
industry, and offshore contractors of all allegations of bribery, corruption, and fraud.84
The ANC government welcomed the report as a vindication of its position that the
arms deal had been negotiated in an honest and contractually compliant manner.
Nonetheless, the Seriti Commission’s findings failed to douse the flames of alleged cor-
ruption in the arms deal and linked offset programme, and the debate continues una-
bated. Public unease reached a new nadir in August 2019 when the Pretoria High
Court ruled in favour of an application to review and set aside the findings of the
Seriti Commission. Civil organisations, such as Right2Know and Corruption Watch,
argued that the 2016 findings, firstly, misled the public through selective presentation
of evidence, and, secondly, led to exoneration of politicians involved in wrongdoing
during the arms deal saga. South Africa’s former President Jacob Zuma became
embroiled in the escalating scandal when in October 2019 he was ordered to stand
trial on corruption charges linked to the arms deal. The charges against Zuma were orig-
inally filed a decade previously, but were set aside by the National Prosecuting Authority
just before his 2009 presidential election success.85
More than 700 criminal charges are pending against Zuma, and form part of a broader
network of state-engineered corrupt practices;86 the phenomenon becoming known as
“state capture”. The term was popularised by the former legal ombudsman, Thuli
Madonsela, and refers to the wholesale takeover of public institutions by associates of
Mr Zuma, often facilitated by international firms. Mass looting of public assets
through state capture is estimated to have cost South Africa $34bn.87 Amongst those
allegedly capturing large parts of South Africa’s levers of power, even extending to
influencing the appointment of President Zuma’s Cabinet ministers, were the Gupta
brothers.88 In October 2019, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the
Gupta family, describing them as “members of a significant corruption network”.89
The damage to South Africa’s international reputation was grave: in 1966, Transparency
International rated the Republic as the least corrupt in Africa, but is now assessed as more
corrupt than poorer states such as Rwanda, Namibia, and Senegal.90 The result is that
public and corporate trust has been undermined, and the global brand of South
Africa’s defence industry damaged, severely hampering export prospects.
Unethical arms exports worsen reputational damage
Reputational damage matters, because since independence South Africa’s overseas
defence sales have been desperately needed to shore-up the collapse in local defence
spending. Although the offset programme did infuse demand into the local defence
economy, the effects were limited, translating into localised endeavours rather than a
broader re-energising of the country’s ailing defence industrial base. SADI’s malaise
has thus continued uninterrupted. The government had no appetite for increased
defence spending, so inevitably policy attention was re-oriented from internal to “exter-
nal” sourcing of demand. Yet, efforts to foster overseas arms sales have been negatively
impacted by a series of “improper” arms export deals.
The problems began during the earlier embargo era, and related to export deals to
combatant states involved in the Falklands and Persian Gulf Wars.91 There was therefore
an urgent need to reinvent South Africa’s tainted global image, and Pretoria began this
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task in 1994 by seeking to persuade the international community that post-apartheid
South Africa was a “responsible stakeholder”. A National Conventional Arms Control
Committee (NCACC) was established to serve as a government watchdog in the approval
of defence-related exports. The NCACC symbolised Pretoria’s commitment to tightening
arms export controls and preventing South African weapons winding up in the hands of
governments that violate human rights, engage in civil wars, or pursue aggression against
other countries.
However, in the late 1990s there were further breeches in South Africa’s self-imposed
arms export controls. These included arms sales to Rwanda that contravened a UN
embargo concerning states in civil conflict.92 In July 1997, the South African government
sought to further to tighten export controls and promote even greater levels of transpar-
ency by introducing new regulations stipulating maximum public disclosure of all arms
sales and transfers to other countries. However, this did not stem the unrelenting criti-
cism of South Africa’s arms exports. For instance, a 2000 report revealed that South
African arms had been sold to Algeria, Angola, Colombia, the Republic of Congo (Braz-
zaville), India, Namibia, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Uganda throwing into doubt yet again
the robustness of Pretoria’s arms export control regime.93 There were also allegations
that South Africa was selling arms to the “questionable” Libya regime, eventually
confirmed by the NCACC in 2011.94
The NCACC did its best to change the culture of compliance “avoidance”. However,
in 2009 the opposition party criticised South Africa’s arms export control regime, arguing
that it allowed “dodgy deals” to be pursued with questionable regimes, such as Iran,
Libya, and Syria.95 Compounding the government’s problems, in 2012 the opposition
called on the NCACC to probe allegations of a sanctions-busting deal to supply helicop-
ter parts to Iran via a network of front companies.96
The robustness of the NCACC arms export control regime was further questioned in
October 2018, after press disclosures suggesting that South African arms were fuelling
Yemen’s conflict.97 In response, the government suspended arms exports to Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the major combatants in the Yemeni
conflict. With export authorisations stalled since May 2019, the suspension will seriously
impact SADI. According to the 2016 and 2017 NCACC Reports, South Africa supplied
heavy artillery guns, assault rifles, ammunition, armoured vehicles, surveillance and mili-
tary technology to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, amounting to more than R3bn.98 In 2018,
around a third (R1.5bn) of South Africa’s defence exports were shipped to these two
countries, being the principal customers of more than half Rheinmetall Denel Munitions’
(RDM) exports to the Middle East.99
From defence industrial sovereignty to international engagement
Persistent revelations concerning South Africa’s infringement of national and inter-
national strategic export control regulations have emerged against the backdrop of slack-
ening international demand for South African arms exports. Overseas demand declined
dramatically by 35 per cent between 2009–13 and 2014–18, while its share of global major
arms exports flat-lined below 0.5 per cent across 2009–18.100 In 2017, arms exports
reached R11bn exceeding by a wide margin SANDF’s R7bn local acquisition
budget,101 and demonstrating clearly the collapse in domestic spending. Relatively
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speaking, South Africa is now small fry in the arms market, ranked a lowly 22nd across
2014–18, below Australia, Belarus, and Czechia.102 Adding to the sector’s vulnerability,
its demand structure is overly concentrated on the Middle East, as the principal regional
customer. Moreover, a country’s arms exports normally exhibit a lower value than its
defence spending, not the reverse. However, South Africa’s arms export-procurement
ratio (R11bn exports against R7bn procurement) in 2017 was an atypical 1.57. The com-
paratively low procurement spending will erode the potential to evolve “dynamic” com-
parative advantages and undermine the pursuit of long-run defence industrial
sustainability.
In the face of continuous defence funding shortfalls, and persistent questions over the
probity and transparency of decision-making, Pretoria has now introduced policies to
stimulate both “internal and external” demand via the 2017 defence industrial strategy.103
The seeds for this revised strategic framework were sown long ago in the Government of
National Unity’s Defence Review in 2003. Policies were introduced to promote compe-
tition, co-operation, and affordability, and explicitly acknowledged that self-sufficiency
was no longer the primary criterion of defence industrial policy. Instead, the government
decided to pursue what it termed “limited self-sufficiency” in pre-determined key tech-
nology fields. Moreover, Pretoria highlighted that procurement preference should be
accorded to local suppliers (51 per cent owned by South Africans), especially with
respect to identified sovereign capabilities.104 The goal was to seek opportunities as
high up the value-added manufacturing platform/systems chain as possible, and partner-
ships with foreign companies were to be encouraged. Formal abandonment of complete
self-sufficiency would necessarily mean greater international defence industrial engage-
ment, especially through international co-operation. The approach would require
South African firms positioning themselves as specialised contractors, or sub-suppliers
to major international defence companies, not an easy task given that funding shortfalls
had forced companies to reduce their defence-industrial footprint. Nevertheless, devel-
opment and production costs were slashed, sales of local defence companies to overseas
interests robustly pursued and international technology-sharing aggressively promoted.
Denel, in particular, sought to integrate itself into the global OEM supply chains of
Leonardo, Alenia Aeronautica, BAE Systems, Dassault, Gulfstream, Lockheed Martin,
Rolls-Royce, Saffron, and Saab.105 Saab, for example, had supported Denel Aerospace
(DAe) to develop ground-based air defence systems solutions in the integration of the
Swedish firm’s Giraffe AMD surveillance radar with Denel’s Umkhonto surface-to-air
missile.106 Also, Airbus Defence and Space has partnered with DAe in the production
of components for the A400M military airlift programme.107 South Africa’s pursuit of
partnerships with major foreign defence contractors has continued until the present
time. For example, Paramount has recently agreed a number of overseas partnerships,
including working with Italy’s Leonardo Sp to develop jointly weapons and aircraft for
the African market, increasing production in Kazakhstan of armoured vehicles and
unmanned aerial vehicles, and teaming up with Singapore’s ST Engineering to market
a line of armoured vehicles internationally.108
To supplement this corporate endeavour, Pretoria launched a “defence diplomacy”
campaign in 2017 to engage in high-level defence co-operation. A factor in Pretoria’s
favour when playing the diplomacy card is South Africa’s non-aligned status. The
defence-diplomacy approach began primarily via interactions with non-Western
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powers. For instance, there is an incipient strategic partnership between ARMSCOR and
Moscow’s state arms export corporation, Rosoboronexport, aimed at positioning South
Africa as a continental maintenance, repair, and overhaul hub for African militaries oper-
ating Soviet/Russian-built equipment.109 In parallel, there are projects directed towards
combining Russian and South African systems in military weapons destined for export
markets. An example of this business model is the integration of South African produced
multi-sensor warning systems in the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s Russian-built Sukhoi
Su-30MKM Flanker-H multi-role fighter jets.110 Another Russian client state, India,
has also been targeted. As part of South Africa’s so-called “Outward Selling Mission”,
local defence companies will be paired with Indian enterprises possessing similar
product structures to exploit development synergies in small and medium calibre ammu-
nition, unmanned aerial vehicles, robotics and artificial intelligence.111
South Africa also plans to consolidate and expand major defence-industrial partner-
ships with high- and middle-income emerging states in the Middle East and African
regions. A good example here is the Autumn 2018 mooted collaboration between
South African and Saudi defence companies. Riyadh is the world’s third-largest
defence spender, and as part of its ambitious Vision 2030 strategy, is seeking partnerships
to develop its domestic defence industry with the goal of localising half its military spend-
ing by 2030. Driven by this strategy, Saudi Arabia’s Military Industries (SAMI) Corpor-
ation, the kingdom’s principal defence company, has entered into discussions with major
South African firms, not only to invest in the Republic but also to engage in “reverse”
investment in the Kingdom, including the opening of a munitions factory in Al-Kharj.112
As evidence of Saudi Arabia’s commitment, SAMI reportedly made a $1bn bid for a
broad partnership with Denel, including acquisition of a minority stake in a joint venture
with Germany’s South African company, Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM).113 The
deal faltered due to Rheinmetall’s reluctance to dilute its 51 per cent equity share in
RDM; indeed, it harbours the opposite intent of raising its share to over 80 per
cent.114 There is also the suggestion that Rheinmetall viewed the South Africa-Saudi
joint venture proposal as a means of avoiding Germany’s rigorous export laws forbidding
arms sales to Saudi Arabia.115 SAMI subsequently signed a collaborative defence agree-
ment with South Africa’s Paramount Group as part of its broader partnering efforts to
promote Saudi Arabian defence industrialisation.116
The loss of the Saudi deal has left Denel perilously vulnerable. It remains South
Africa’s biggest defence-industrial player, accounting for around 50 per cent of the coun-
try’s defence output, but it is a troubled company. Employment has fallen from over
15,000 in 1992 to around only 5,000 in 2017.117 Presently drained of liquidity, it is
faced with a R3bn debt on principal and interest payments.118 For the past decade,
Denel has hovered between profit and loss, presently surviving only because of govern-
ment financial assistance.119 To make matters worse, the company is implicated in the
Gupta corruption allegations.
To succeed, South Africa’s ambitious arms export initiatives will need to overcome
several major challenges. In July 2013, the senior quality auditor of Rheinmetall Denel
Munitions (RDM) claimed that the company was in “‘extreme chaos” due to inade-
quately addressing problems relating to product quality.120 South Africa has also recently
been criticised for losing its technological edge. In October 2017, a spokesperson for the
South African defence firm, Paramount, stated that local defence industry had effected
DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 13
little real technological breakthroughs in recent years and that most companies were
selling 15–20 year old technology.121 Development of innovative weapons technologies,
the forte of ARMSCOR during the embargo era, has stalled, principally because the
SANDF lacks the funds to order new equipment or to support R&D.122 Finally, dramatic
contraction of the domestic defence market has meant that exporters must somehow
convince foreign clients to buy South African equipment no longer procured by SANDF.
Survival through “stabilisation and sustainment”: 2015
There is now a real policy urgency in addressing the defence industry’s plight. The
Defence Review 2015 warned that a funds-starved SANDF was in a “critical state of
decline” and that continued “neglect” of defence capability could impact everything
from border security to trade, constraining Pretoria’s continental peacekeeping and dip-
lomatic ambitions.123 Arms export diplomacy is a critically important step, but must
form part of a wider coherent defence industrial strategy. The creation of the National
Defence Industrial Council (NDIC) in 2017 was aimed at formulating such a strategy
to strengthen defence industrial reform. Part of its new approach was the implementation
of a “Defence Sector Charter” aimed at black economic empowerment, and a targeted 60
per cent utilisation of locally produced components and products.124 In the same year,
the long-awaited Defence Industry Strategy drafted on behalf of the NDIC emphasised
that “a vibrant defence industry remains a crucial component of an effective South
African defence capability, providing the country with a defence and security industrial
base that must be positioned to ensure attainment of the Defence Review objectives and
the pursuit of a Defence Strategic Trajectory”; this so-called trajectory includes the search
for strategic independence, sovereign capability in selected areas, optimised equipment
and systems, and the supply of cost effective equipment, systems and services to the
defence and other security services.125
The fear, however, is that such reforms are too little, too late. According to the Strategy
document, between 1989–90 and 2016–17 acquisition from local industry fell from
R26.2bn to R7bn, R&D from R6.1bn to R850mn, turnover from R31.6bn to R19bn
and employment from 130,000 across 3,000 companies to just 15,000 from 120 compa-
nies.126 Policymakers seeking to reverse defence industrial decline, therefore, face a her-
culean task. The need to overcome stifling domestic constraints on funding is
acknowledged in the Strategy, but it also argues that the only practical option is to “stabil-
ise and sustain” the defence industry (meaning, retaining those defence industry capabili-
ties that are still viable and recovering others deemed essential). Yet, the solution is
premised on the assumption that government will provide adequate funding for the
defence force to cover operational employment, training and maintenance, as well as
acquisition of equipment systems, spares, munitions, and stores, while also envisaging
future government funding for R&D to secure the future of both SANDF and SADI.
The primary purpose of South Africa’s defence industry, according to the Strategy, is
to give the country a measure of strategic independence and freedom of strategic
action, but it needs government to focus on developing…“indigenous industry to
avoid subjugating South African interests to those of other states”.127
The Strategy posits that the intention is not to recreate the full breadth and depth of
capabilities developed during the apartheid era but to…“focus on areas and sectors of
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defence technology and manufacturing that offer real potential to meet the government’s
policy intent”.128 This cost-effective approach is in line with the 2003 Defence Review
directive aimed at limited, but not full self-sufficiency. Yet, over a decade has passed
and little has been achieved. The pressure to act has become immediate, and this was
made plain in October 2017, when ARMSCOR’s CEO warned that persistent DoD
cuts have left South Africa’s defence industry facing “a very bleak future”.129 A similar
ominous warning was advanced in the NDIC Strategy, stating that…“failing adequate
funding it will not be possible to implement the ‘stabilise and sustain’ approach, and it
will be necessary to go over to a planned shutdown strategy [meaning, a carefully
planned and executed retention of some core maintenance, repair and overhaul
capability]”.130
Conclusion
This paper traces the post-1994 decline of South Africa’s defence industry after disman-
tlement of the odious apartheid regime. The political thrust of the then new ANC gov-
ernment was aimed at quickly restructuring and regenerating the country’s war
economy, focusing instead on human security and the pursuit of a neglected develop-
ment agenda that would benefit all strata of society. The resultant negative impact on
the defence industry was immediate, with companies suffering a mixture of benign
policy neglect and draconian cuts to defence funding.
South Africa’s policy efforts to overcome defence demand deficiency included defence
offset, arms exports and international partnership, but each of these initiatives suffered
serious problems. A review of the literature suggests much ambiguity over the impact
of the offset package. Similarly, in the South African context, while it is likely that
offsets did contribute to raised economic activity, in the short-run the costs were high,
and in the long-run the package failed to act as a locomotive of “sustainable” defence
industrialisation, creating only pockets of development. South Africa’s arms deal was
sold on the basis that four times the procurement value would be generated in the
form of new offset-related manufacturing investment in South Africa, but the reality
was that most of the offset projects exploited existing defence industrial capacity
rather than widening and deepening capability.
In sum, then, South Africa’s efforts to rekindle defence demand have proved difficult.
Offset beneficiaries were provided with subcontract work rather than access to frontier
technologies, with the latter remaining the preserve of the offshore defence vendors. Sus-
tainable defence export orders have similarly proved elusive, save to countries involved in
conflict or in violation of human rights, in contravention of South African legislation.
Finally, without healthy increases in local R&D expenditure, South Africa’s defence
industry will remain vulnerable to the whims of major global OEMs, especially given
the intense competition to access these supply chains from other offset recipient states
across the world.
The deterioration of South Africa’s defence industrial capability offers lessons to other
industrialising nations seeking to promote economic, industrial, and technological devel-
opment at the same time as investing huge amounts of scarce capital into building-up
arms manufacturing capacity. Defence industrial innovation and ensuing export
success worked for South Africa during the 25-year border war, but the experience
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was a child of its time. Post-1994, defence investment has become increasingly difficult to
justify in the absence of a strategic threat. From this perspective, the costly 1989 arms deal
made no sense, save for reasons of political legitimacy, diplomatic power, and inter-
national prestige. In its aftermath, the South African government and its institutions
have faced major criticism over corrupt and unethical defence practices. Investigation
and judicial reviews of not just the arms deal, but also its linked offset programme and
contemporary arms export activities are ongoing. Yet, irrespective of eventual outcomes,
the danger is that continued uncertainty will tarnish South Africa’s broader industrial
brand.
Given all these difficulties, and the continuing terminal decline of the country’s
defence industry, the question has to be asked whether the high opportunity cost of
defence-related investment in a country racked with economic and social inequalities
is viable. At the signing of the arms deal in 1989, it was tortuously difficult for Pretoria
to justify the huge diversion of capital and labour resources in the absence of any mean-
ingful strategic threat. Three decades on, the notion that an indigenous defence industrial
base is integral to South Africa’s national security is even less persuasive.
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